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The Interagency Process Behind US Policy on Taiwan How the US government interacts with Taiwan on economic, political, and security issues has long been a mystery to me. The US does not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which is a breakaway province of China, and the unresolved status of Taiwan is the main challenge to US relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This paper will endeavor to shed light on how the current interagency process on US-Taiwan relations came into being since the US, under the Nixon Administration, began normalizing relations with the People's
Republic of China (PRC). It will examine the bilateral documents and US laws that are the foundation of US-Taiwan relations, focusing on the roles played by the people, organizations, and processes that formulate and implement US policy regarding Taiwan. US arms sales to
Taiwan are now at an all time high, will illustrate the complexities of this interagency process.
Summary
Strong personalities in government and non-government institutions have influenced the evolution of US-Taiwan relations in the last half-century. Individuals and groups played the key roles-US presidents, Taiwan presidents, members of the US Congress, lobbyists and interest groups. Since the start of the Cold War, every US president since Harry Truman had to deal with balancing the US role in the US-China-Taiwan triangle. It took a staunch conservative Republican, President Richard Nixon, to initiate the opening of US-PRC relations. In the 1990s, it was Taiwan President Lee Tenghui who caused headaches for the US and China with 
US Presidents and the China Lobby
The support for Taiwan -The PRC is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a province of China -Opposition to the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," "an independent Taiwan" or that advocate "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." The TRA, the cornerstone of US- Taiwan -The US does not seek to conduct a "long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," -US arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed 1982 levels, and -The US will gradual reduce sales of arms "over a period of time" to final resolution.
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During negotiations with the PRC on the third Communiqué, the Taiwan government presented the US government with six points to be used as guidelines in conducting US-Taiwan relations.
These points became the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan to which the Reagan Administration agreed and informed Congress of this agreement, including -The US would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan, -The US would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, and -The US would not consult with China in advance of US-China arms sales. This bottom-up process had been in place until the later years of the Clinton Administration when Taiwan arms sales became highly politicized and the media drew much pubic attention to it. In the mid-1990s, media coverage of AIT during one December Taiwan delegation visit prompted last minute arrangements to hold the talks at National Defense University where press access would be minimized.
Taiwan arms sales were sometimes referred to as the "Taiwan Bucket" which was supposed to be a yearly cap in compliance with the 1982 Communiqué calling for the US to reduce arms sales by 20 percent each year 13 . In reality, the 1992 sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan breached this cap and subsequent sales have ignored limits imposed by the 1982 communiqué.
Clinton Administration and Taiwan
In early 1993, the Clinton Administration approved arms sales to Taiwan Toward the end of his presidency in 1999, Lee Tenghui touched off PRC sensitivities with a comment to a German radio interview that Taiwan was prepared to conduct "state-to-state" dialog with the PRC. 16 The statement disputed the basis of US-PRC relations being the "one China" policy. Jesse Helms promptly supported Lee's statement by calling Taiwan a "de-facto sovereign state." 17 Once more, President Clinton enunciated the US position, citing the pillars of policy toward Taiwan known as the "Three No's":
1. No Independence for Taiwan, 2. No "two Chinas" or "one Taiwan, one China" and 3. No membership for Taiwan in any organization for which statehood is required.
US-Taiwan Today
The interagency process of deliberating on arms sales to Taiwan has improved over the last few years. According to one US official, the Clinton Administration at the end of its tenure focused on developing better processes and timetables. The December and April "tag team" Finally, the Bush Administration must establish US-Taiwan policy in the larger context of US-China policy. As President Bush's first encounter with China was over the unfortunate EP-3 incident, both China and the US are anxious to move on to more a constructive relationship. As US-PRC military-to-military relations are being restored, US must decide on China's role in the region and the world-is it a strategic adversary or a possible ally. Since the events of September 11, the prospect of alliance with China in the war on terrorism opens up opportunities and risks.
As the Bush government assesses China as an ally or an adversary, the consequences of USTaiwan relations must, therefore, follow.
